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Abstract  
 
This article examines the ways in which (pop or) popular culture may fall within the 
context of foreign policy. More specifically, it situates our analysis against such 
backdrop by delving into how Turkey effectively exports pop culture, propaganda and 
positive images of itself via the use of television (TV) shows. To that end, notable 
Turkish soap operas market its ancient glorious past. Admittedly, these telenovelas 
form a salient cultural product export for Turkey as they reach diverse and far-away 
audiences – from Latin America to Russia, Central Asia, North Africa, the Middle East, 
and the Balkans, to merely name a few.  
Paradoxically, the frenzy has even reached places like Greece. Not to mention, Serbia 
or Israel, with the latter’s phenomenal success accompanied also with some backlash. 
Therefore, the current study seeks to better understand the magnitude alongside the 
impact of Turkey’s achievement given how it comprises a multi-million-dollar industry, 
by partially unearthing what makes Turkish TV series so powerful the world over. 
Further, this research firstly presents an analysis of the hegemonic efforts before 
presenting the limitations to its success by thoroughly covering the empirical data 
while, theoretically framing it.  
 
Keywords: TV series, Soap Operas, Turkey, Pop Culture, Propaganda, Soft Power, 
Propaganda 
 
Introduction    
 
The current article aims at understanding how Turkey exports pop culture, propaganda and 
positive images of itself, as aspects of hegemony, via the use of television (TV) serials. The 
article examines the recent expansion of the Turkish TV sector and its positive as well as 
negative reverberations in the regions where serials happened to be transmitted. Further, it 
provides a discussion on the transnational impact of the Turkish TV series by drawing on 
various academic and journalistic sources. As such, it strives to provide to the reader a 
coherent and critical account on the phenomenon under study. Moreover, this article 
contributes further into the extant literature by placing emphasis on the propagandistic factor 
as well, an element that happens to be absent in similar analyses such as that by Yoruk and 
Vatikiodis (2013).       
                                                        
*
Constantinos Constantinou, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Cyprus Centre for Business Research, Cyprus 
Institute of Marketing (CIM), Cyprus. Email: constantinos@cima.ac.cy.      
**
Zenonas Tziarras, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus, 
Cyprus. Email: zenonas.tziarras@hotmail.com [corresponding author].  
New Middle Eastern Studies, 8 (1) 
24 
 
The main thesis of the article consists of how the growth of the AKP’s (Justice and 
Development Party) domestic hegemony over the years has gradually enabled Turkey to 
pursue regional and international hegemony thanks also to the TV serials. It synopsizes the 
essence of the main argument by stating how the more the AKP’s legitimacy erodes 
domestically, the more difficult it is for Ankara to effectively export hegemonic narratives 
and exert hegemonic power. Indeed, there is an increasing resistance to Turkish TV serials in 
places like Greece and the Gulf. It must be noted, however, that although a government can 
surely promote soft power through its agencies, it nonetheless has often a limited control on 
its contents.  
Beyond any shadow of doubt, pop culture happens to be vital as far as the foreign 
policy procedure is concerned (Holland 2014: 22). Further, one of the most typical and 
fruitful tactics aimed at showing a positive image of a nation abroad consists of the sharing of 
its culture via cultural diplomacy; analogous techniques found in public relations may, 
indeed, prove fertile in public diplomacy too. For instance, using media such as audio-visuals 
to their full potential lies at the core of the majority of public diplomacy strategies (Pigman 
2014: 124).       
Turkish pop culture is projected to the Middle East as an instrument of alternative 
foreign policy (Yanardağoğlu and Karam 2013: 562). In fact, Turkish television series and 
soap operas happen to be utilised as nation-branding instruments, with the most well-known 
television soap operas (TSOs or soaps henceforth) actors having joined ambassadors at 
receptions held at consulates (Yalkin 2017: 1, 6). Turkish TV series first rose to prominence 
on a global scale in the mid-2000s (Al Arabiya News 2014) – with a wave of Turkish stars 
given the red carpet treatment all over the Middle East (Sevim 2012). As for the TV series 
culture in Turkey, it has started to rise exponentially ever since the 1990s (Vitrinel 2017: 2). 
The exported series – forming a cultural good besides its exported educational services 
(Ennis and Momani 2013: 1130; Çakır and Akdağ 2017: 339) – depend on a strong mix of 
slick production, storylines full of passion as well as intrigue, beautiful actors/actresses and 
iconic Turkish sites. 
To be sure, the shows have played their part in projecting a positive image of Turkey, 
with the Culture Ministry directly connecting the dramas to the recent upsurge in the amount 
of tourists to Turkey from Arab countries. Needless to say, the CEO of Turkey's Global 
Agency, that distributes “Magnificent Century” (Muhteşem Yüzyıl) plus other recent hits, 
states that, they are presenting Turkey to millions of viewers, displaying the beautiful scenery 
along with their lifestyle and traditions and so, ad verbatim, they: have a great influence on 
people through soft power (Williams 2013).  
Against this background, this article seeks to look at how Turkey utilizes TV series as a 
foreign policy tool in order to export propaganda and positive images about itself, and how 
these efforts complement the broader aims of Turkish foreign policy (TFP) since the early 
2000s. Lastly, the article examines the backlash that TV series have caused in many cases for 
TFP, thus revealing the limits of Turkey’s hegemonic efforts abroad. 
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Turkish Power and Foreign Policy 
 
The role and importance of TV series/TSOs is best understood when contextualized within 
the broader framework of TFP and the way it has developed since the early 2000s and the rise 
of the AKP to power. The elements of Turkish power and the means through which it is 
projected in foreign policy have been puzzling scholars and pundits for some time. The 
argument that Turkey is – or could be – a regional power and hegemon (or a rising great 
power) is not new in the debate about TFP. For example, Malik Mufti refers to former 
Turkish president, Celal Bayar, who in 1957 talked about Turkey’s efforts to become a “little 
America.” Turkish leaderships that followed, especially the AKP, shared this idea which 
“encapsulates an aspiration for national greatness characterized by economic 
entrepreneurship and prosperity, dynamic political and social pluralism, and an assertive 
foreign policy” (Mufti 2011: 1).  
The question is, what kind of power does Turkey have and what are its power 
projection, as well as foreign policy, aspirations? Undeniably, Turkey is a powerful country 
in terms of “hard power,” which is usually measured based on qualitative factors, such as a 
country’s military, economy, geography, and population and the way these factors can be 
utilized to achieve a state’s strategic goals or impose its will on others if need be.1 In other 
words, a state’s ability to set the (geo)political agenda, thus having an impact on what can be 
discussed and done according to its own interests, is considered as another component of hard 
power (Lukes 2005: 20-25). The projection of Turkey’s hard power has become much more 
salient in recent years especially in its military and economic dimension.
2
   
But hard power is only one aspect of national power. Another aspect is that of “soft 
power.” According to Joseph Nye, soft power comprises of the skill to structure a situation in 
such way that others will desire what you want, that is, develop preferences or define their 
interests in ways that are in accordance to those of your own nation (Jackson and Sørensen 
2013: 184, 313). To illustrate this further, the European Union (EU) accession process of 
Turkey helped alter its foreign policy apparatuses as it begun employing, say, cultural soft 
power tools to a bigger extent; with soap operas becoming a significant actor, for example, in 
Turkey’s Balkan relations (Demirta 2015: 135, 137). Indeed, the recent attractiveness of TV 
series in Arab nations is credited for ameliorating the appeal of Turkey as a point of cultural 
orientation as well (Clarke 2016: 160).  
Soft power is central to this discussion on popular culture, cultural diplomacy and 
foreign policy. It is also worth underlining that the concept of soft power has been widely 
utilised to describe the mounting popularity of Turkey in its region and beyond, particularly, 
owing to its cultural products. Indeed, the aforesaid cultural diplomacy has matched well with 
the “new era” of TFP. On the whole, the rising visibility of TV series (aired by countless TV 
stations in the Middle East and the Balkans, with Turkish artists being embraced as 
celebrities) reflects the wide brand appeal Turkey has relished, serving to beget interest in 
Turkish language and culture (Fidan 2013: 95). Further, the soft power of Turkey in places 
such as Africa has been immensely augmented during the past decade and seems to be rising 
quite rapidly (Ng’ang’a 2018) – not to mention other markets such as Spain (Gonzalez 2018). 
Within Turkey’s milieu, it is worthwhile pointing out the salience of Turkey’s soft power in 
the Sunni Muslim world; especially as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already ascertained 
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himself to be the “Sultan of Soft Power” in the wider Sunni Muslim world, positioning 
himself as a champion for Palestine in places transcending Turkey and the Sunni Arab world 
(Garrie 2018).    
These two dimensions of national power (hard and soft power) could be ultimately 
combined into one, that of “smart power” (Nye 2011: 20-23) which, as illustratively put by 
one author, “heals with the velvet, gloved hand of policy while judiciously resorting to the 
mailed fist only when extreme circumstances warrant it” (Chong 2015: 233). An older and 
probably more accurate conception – one could argue – of this kind of power is Antonio 
Gramsci’s “hegemony.” Explaining the Gramscian hegemony in a statement that strongly 
resembles the concept of smart power, Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair write: “Gramsci 
took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary 
combination of consent and coercion;” and they go on to add that hegemony prevails “To the 
extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront” (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 127). 
From this perspective, it can be argued that soft power is not really that “soft”, for it 
works better in a broader power context. Nye himself notes that “soft power resources often 
work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce 
the desired outcomes” (Nye 2004: 99). Which means that soft power is neither itself the 
policy nor does it define it; it merely shapes the environment in which policy is conducted, 
and this policy might well be coercive or hard power centred. In the same vein, Janice Bially 
Mattern (2005: 583-584) holds that “soft power should not be understood in juxtaposition to 
hard power but as a continuation of it by different means.” Namely, it is just another way of 
getting one’s way, not necessarily by coercion but by indirect imposition too. And if soft 
power is, again, about – helping in – making someone do something that they would not 
otherwise do, then it is ultimately not that “soft” while, in the grand scheme of things, smart 
power is not that different from the concept of hegemony either. 
Given that in the concept of hegemony “domination is facilitated by the fact that the 
dominated consent to, and indeed embrace and internalize, the norms and values of the 
prevailing order,” (Mufti 2011: 4) one could argue that Turkey does not really possess 
hegemonic power, even though it aspires to, as Arab and Muslim populations states have not 
fully embraced or internalized Turkish norms and values as the AKP government would like 
to. There is a rather opposite pattern emerging, with state and non-state actors reacting to 
Turkey’s hegemonic efforts, that points to the fact that there is a gap between Turkey’s 
foreign policy aspirations and actual capabilities (for more on the Turkish model, see Göksel 
2012; Tziarras 2013; Göksel 2014; Tuğal 2016). 
In order for Turkey to successfully manage to break away from its Middle Eastern 
isolation towards a hegemonic and greater power status, it needs to go beyond the limits of 
material power (e.g. military and economic), for a state cannot lead without having 
ideological power. And this is related both to the concept of soft power and the selective use 
of force in the context of smart power. In short, for Turkey, it is a matter of acquiring 
hegemonic power and influence. It goes without saying that Turkey’s projection of power, be 
it material or ideological, is by definition more possible to be impactful in states or regions 
with closer geographical and cultural proximity to it. For example, it is much more difficult 
for Turkey to cultivate or capitalize on ideological power in Latin America as opposed to the 
Middle East or the Balkans. And as the possibility of positive outcomes for Turkey is higher 
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in such places, similarly, the possibility for a negative backlash is higher as well since the 
power projection can be more easily perceived negatively. 
In what follows, we focus on the aspect of TV series as a means (a soft 
power/hegemonic foreign policy tool) that seeks to cultivate ideological power in the context 
of Turkey’s broader hegemonic efforts, driven by the AKP’s desire to create a distinct and 
“dynamic cultural axis” as part of its outward and independent foreign policy orientation 
(Davutoğlu 2010: 159). Moreover, we also look at the backlash and resistance that these 
efforts have stirred in the domain of TV series – a natural side-effect of hegemonic 
aspirations.  
 
On TV Series 
 
As already mentioned, Turkish TV series have proved to be quite successful around the 
globe: from South America, Central Asia, and Pakistan to the Balkans and Russia. In point of 
fact, if we were to take the last ten years, Turkish TV series have become a main player in the 
international TV industry as 25 per cent of imported fiction content on a global scale derives 
from Turkey (Binici 2017). Furthermore, reports rank Turkey as the second-highest exporter 
of TV series following the United Sates (US), selling to disparate nations, that is, to more 
than 140 countries (Daily Sabah 2017), alongside a business volume assessed to surpass $350 
million as of 2017 (Mathai 2017). Removing any room for doubt, the Arab world comprises 
its largest market (Tokyay 2017), with the industry having gone stratospheric (Ozsoy and 
Karakaya 2017) even as some series realised phenomenal success in the Arab world and 
turned stars (e.g., actor Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ and actress Serenay Sarıkaya) into household names 
(AFP 2018).   
To take the example of the US, it must be noted that entertainment shows are 
characterised by a proclivity to follow the line of the government, particularly, when a 
national security crisis occurs; for instance, the pro-torture Fox TV drama series 24 (Nacos 
2013: 336, 349). The Islamic world’s version of US culture war takes place in an 
extravagantly reproduced 16th century palace; more precisely, in a state-of-the-art television 
studio in Istanbul. “Magnificent Century” happens to be one of the most popular programs in 
Turkey (besides being the eminent show in the Middle East), broadcasted in 45 nations, with 
the programs subtly altering cultural norms (Rohde 2012). Intriguingly, “Magnificent 
Century” (a slickly shot soap opera which has become a worldwide sensation), is paralleled 
to “Sex and the City” with fans from Israel (using the Hebrew subtitles, tempting its big 
Russian-speaking population) and the Arab world, besides viewers from Cairo to Kosovo 
(Izikovich 2014). Undeniably, some Turkish dramas evoke a reachable modernity (Burkart 
and Christensen 2013: 5); a modernity that has been attractive to Arabs (Kraidy and Al-
Ghazzi 2013: 26), seeing such a flawless Muslim and secular country (Matthews 2011).     
The Turkish series, widespread primarily in the Middle East, Balkans and North Africa, 
have a particularly strong impact with respect to women across the region. Further, in an 
inspirational film that reveals the impact of TV series on women across the region, about half 
way (specifically, at 28:40’) one can see journalist Nikolaos Hiladakis talking about how the 
TV series under discussion comprise the “soft political power” of Turkey (Paschalidou 2014). 
As for Africa, in Morocco, TV series happen to be the most watched TV programs; in fact, 
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some of these manage to attract up to 6 million viewers per episode (Kasraoui 2017). Not to 
mention, how the soft power of Turkey – that is, the aspect of its film industry with its TV 
series – reaches also places like Somalia, too, with Turkish drama series winning over 
Hollywood and Bollywood as the former last for months whilst providing entertainment on a 
daily basis (Mohamed 2018).
3
        
Concerning propaganda and manipulation, other than existing for the sake of politics, 
the aforesaid two words also play a pivotal role in the everyday lives of individuals as well as 
pop culture (Karakartal 2017). But, what exactly is propaganda? It is when a government tries 
hard to influence people to think in a specific manner; a practice that has long been around, 
evident, for example, during the First World War (BBC 2017). Today, in the case under 
examination, it still manifests itself by having the Turkish government trying to persuade the 
general public to think of present-day Turkey in their preferred way.  
In view of the representation of liberated women on the screen, Arab women have 
reportedly been filing for divorce with their spouses thanks to Turkish dramas providing a 
sense of freedom for them (as before, they stayed at home for the majority of time) (Georgiou 
2012: 874). Nonetheless, some guess that the TV industry forms part of a hidden agenda to 
disseminate Turkish power as the government backs the industry with subsidies and funds. 
Put differently, given how Turkey is notorious for violating media freedom, it is believed that 
governmental censorship over the content must exist at least to some extent (Kaplan 2016).   
Although series like “The Last Emperor” – Turkey’s latest TV blockbuster – may relish 
superior production values, its message remains the same given how it comprises of state 
propaganda intended to appeal to watchers’ worst instincts – leaving them with a revisionist, 
conspiratorial narrative of Turkish history. What is more, the series’ villains actually strongly 
resemble those imagined by President Erdoğan, with the entwining of conspiracies (e.g. 
Jewish, Freemasons and other pertaining, for instance, to the Catholic Church) being germane 
to the grand conspiracy referred to by, again, Erdoğan, and watched over by an obscure 
puppet-master he calls “the Mastermind;” the title of a documentary aired on a prominent 
pro-government news channel that, inter alia, exposed how Jews controlled the world for the 
previous 3,500 years (Erdemir and Kessler 2017). 
 
The Impact of TV Series as a TFP Success 
 
The ubiquitous presence of series such as “Diriliş: Ertuğrul”, relishing top weekly TV ratings, 
convey the notion that Turkey has a distinctive mission as the heir of a great empire (a nation 
supposedly established by strong, courageous and wise men). In a scene, the characters talk 
in the aftermath of a battle regarding the sort of idealised empire they shall create (rewarding 
talent and intelligence besides martial competence) (Armstrong 2017). A reason behind the 
witnessed popularity of the dramas in question can be how they mirror the desire of their 
viewers to escape into an imaginary world that is more comforting in contrast to the chaotic 
reality of contemporary Turkey. In a severely polarised nation hit by increasing economic 
trouble and concerned with the war over the border in Syria, these series calms viewers by 
capitalizing on a satisfying myth of Turkish glory (Armstrong 2017).   
Furthermore, Turkish TV series have managed to reach as distant locations as South 
America, with the “Telenovelas Turcas” – as Turkish dramas are known in Argentina – 
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contributing to the improvement of cultural relations between the two countries as soap 
operas bring Turkey to Argentinian living rooms (HDN 2017). In effect, Turkish TV series 
have replaced Latin American shows exploiting the nostalgia for a system of family values 
that individuals in the region have lost. Additionally, the TV series travel from Serbia and 
Albania to Bosnia/Herzegovina and the Black Sea (Hamzic et al. 2013). Intriguingly, 
however, Erdoğan views places like Kosovo as a neo-Ottoman vassal state, with TV series 
aiding in strengthening a positive image of Turkey whilst instilling further admiration 
(Xhambazi 2018).     
It becomes evident here then, that the Ottoman Empire is in fashion not only in regards 
to Turkish politics but, also, to pop culture. One needs to look no further than “Magnificent 
Century”, the 2011 soap opera cantered on the life of Sultan Süleyman, which ran for five 
seasons and accumulated fans from 47 countries. Moreover, because of the growing focus on 
the country’s once glorious ancient past, Turkey’s cultural centres fall short of explicating 
why the nation’s citizens find themselves divided (S.J. 2016). The TV series comprise a true 
pop culture phenomenon and are, in fact, the product of a long tradition of Turkish 
melodrama in cinemas and small screens. The hit “Aşk-ı Memnu” transcended Turkish 
borders as it was also a huge success in Pakistan, with the last episode watched by more than 
90 million people, constituting the first time a foreign drama had relished such high 
viewership in Pakistan (Achilli 2016).     
Alarmingly, some fail to distinguish between watching TV shows like “Reaksiyon” and 
watching the news. Utilizing extant events as a point of departure, other series like 
“Kızılelma” aired on national TV serve viewers a hagiography of Turkey’s progressively 
influential intelligence agency (Zalewski 2015). Additionally, Turkey wishes to augment the 
bulk of the national cultural product exports to $2 billion by 2023 (Natividad 2017). 
Undoubtedly, the Turkish TV industry has become a key economic power in Middle Eastern, 
southern European and Latin American nations, with TV series positively affecting tourism 
as followers become so fascinated by the scenes of their favoured shows that go to really see 
them (Şafak 2016). This reality has actually been termed as “destination marketing” (Koksal 
and Gjana 2015: 230), and has Istanbul challenging hitherto preferred tourist destinations 
such as London or Paris (Bilbassy-Charters 2010). It is thus easy to comprehend how great is 
the power of these TV series whose impact is surely to be taken seriously.  
On the whole, TV series constitute a cultural powerhouse (Natividad 2017). They are 
watched by more than 400 million people, and with the help of very handsome actors, they 
present a seductive modernity, advertised on giant billboards in Chile (e.g., the Turkish series 
called “1,001 Nights” was 2014’s most viewed program in this country). All in all, the series 
have accomplished something that even the best diplomacy strategies would fail to do (Tali 
2016). Even charity fundraising events include Turkish TV drama themes such as, Turkish 
flags, food and music while Erdoğan employed the TV series as a conversation starter when, 
for example, he visited Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Interestingly enough, in Peru one 
commentator proclaimed how alike the two nations’ family values happen to be, regardless of 
their dissimilar religions and cultures (Tali 2016). Lastly, the ongoing overseas success of 
Turkish TV shows is certainly applauded by Erdoğan, as it bolsters the global image and 
reputation of Turkey; and yet, the industry emphasizes that it is totally autonomous and free 
of any government support (Tali 2016).     
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Speaking of ingredients constituting to this success being also the careful selection of 
actors, the couple starring in the Turkish series “Wounded Love” (also called “Vatanım 
Sensin”), Hilal and Leon, made it to TV's Top Couple 2018; that is, they took the top prize 
upon the completion of the poll, leaving behind 63 (mainly) American antagonists, regardless 
of the fact that most Americans did not even know the show and the significant time 
difference between California and Istanbul (Piester 2018).    
With reference to Turkish serials and Greece, turning the heed away from solely TV 
soap operas, it must be noted that in the TV series in question, an attempt is being made to 
create the image of Turkey having nothing to be envy of the modern western world. Attention 
vis-à-vis reality games like the Greek “Survivor”, which comprises yet another Turkish 
production, is certainly worthwhile given the great impact it relishes. One could take, for 
example, the symbolism behind one of the episodes where the invited Turkish renowned chef 
literally fed the hungry – as a result of the financial crisis – Greeks, who had won the “food 
reward” (Diakantonis 2017). Also, films such as the “Roza of Smyrna” deserve attention as 
they were produced by the Argonauts SA with the participation of Turkish production 
company Sarmaşık Sanatlar (filmed in both, Greece and Turkey), becoming the highest-
grossing movie of the season in Greece – now showing at the 24th Delphi Greek Film 
Festival (Skoufatoglou 2017). All the more, it is common for Turkish series’ actors to be 
admired by groups of Greek women (Yörük and Vatikiotis 2013: 2373). That is to say, the 
multifarious craze appears to be here to stay.  
To bring the discussion home, it is thought-provoking, at best, viewing a local (Sigma) 
TV Channel in Cyprus broadcasting purely Turkish productions for the first time in the 
history of Cypriot television (that is, at least since 1974 onwards) (Nomikou 2016). And, 
apart from “Survivor”, now the Turkish TV series “Aşk-I Memnun” airs on the channel of 
Extra Cyprus. It appears that things have changed in Cyprus as such a move in the past could 
have been taken by the local channels as a national issue (Philenews 2017). 
 
Bridging Politics with Business: The Marketing Toolbox 
 
In a wider context, the topic under scrutiny may be placed more within the marketing 
margins. A nexus appears to exist between the marketing function (from a consumption and 
spending perspective) and the marketing of Turkey’s past (presented as a once glorious 
empire to sell its present-day unique mission). For example, Turkish soaps widely viewed in 
the Balkans aid in painting the picture of Turkey as a modern and developed state, and they 
depict the Ottoman past in a glorious and romanticised manner (Zadrożna 2017: 533).   
Theoretically-speaking, there are ten kinds of entities that are being marketed. Apart 
from goods and services, the list also includes events, ideas and experiences (Kotler and 
Keller 2009: 46-7). Taking the case of a museum, what it essentially offers is a service, with 
the delivery of a service being substituted here with the selling of an experience; the success 
of communicating historical facts and information (the core product) rests on the ability to 
construct images, convey information whilst, engaging the visitors (Goulding 2002: 150). 
Apart from museums, firms, too, orchestrate numerous services and goods in an effort to 
create, stage and market an experience. For instance, Disney theme parks form this sort of 
experiential marketing, permitting their clients to visit a fairy kingdom (Kotler and Keller 
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2009: 46). In a similar vein, tourists visit the various locations in Turkey where the filming of 
their favourite (TV drama) scene(s) took place. 
But to stay within the example of museums, such organizations employ marketing to 
strengthen their public images and attract audiences (Kotler and Keller 2009: 47). Not to 
mention that, through such mediums, it becomes plausible to utilize the past so as to maintain 
values that never existed. In post-war Croatia, the intelligentsia and government chose to 
concentrate on museums and heritage sites, as a way of constructing and marketing history 
(Domic 2000: 5, 7). In other words, Turkey seems to know how to manipulate its past, like in 
the case of former Yugoslavia (Domic and Boukas 2017: 232), and market it in such way so 
as to affect its present and future. Not least given how the tactics made hitherto in terms of its 
TV soaps, are far from coincidental as they encompass big investment; with the success of 
Turkish film and TV industry reaching a multi-million dollar worth industry that exports 
culture around the globe as corroborated earlier (Sharma 2018). And part of the result is, of 
course, the acquirement of some ideological power among certain populations. 
 
A Backlash to Turkey’s Hegemonic Efforts   
 
Nevertheless, Turkish TV series have not been received positively everywhere. In the context 
of the AKP’s hegemonic vision on the basis of conservative Turkish and Muslim values, TV 
series depict the magnificent rule of the Ottomans in addition to the glorious civilization 
individuals once enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire, amalgamating Ottoman and religious 
rhetoric so as to gather his supporters around this collective imagination (Xhambazi 2018). 
Yet, it is vital to examine here the backlash or, resistance, as one could argue to what the TV 
series under analysis are projecting and to Turkey's hegemonic project more broadly. 
Especially in view of how, for some time now, various groups have openly been resisting the 
cultural suppression over art on behalf of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP 
government. A case in point is that the AKP moved to ban the extensively popular TV series 
The Magnificent Century (Muhteşem Yüzyıl), denouncing the series as an inappropriate 
portrayal of Turkey’s ancestry and removing it from the inflight entertainment system of 
Turkish Airlines after to the public remarks made by Erdoğan (Hintz 2012).    
To begin with, resistance to TV series is not new. The Greek-Orthodox Bishop 
Anthimos criticised Greek fans of Turkish TV soaps years ago; needless to say that, the 
showbiz community of Greece was also quite unhappy over the issue (Makris 2012). Indeed, 
the Greek TV station ANT1 has decided to stop showing the Turkish dramas as of 2018 
(Planetnews.gr 2018). Furthermore, Turkey’s success has faced some backlash in countries 
like Israel as well, as a Turkish TV drama showed Israeli security forces shooting elderly men 
(McCarthy 2010). In addition, Israeli politicians along with media outlets utterly condemned 
one episode of a prevalent Turkish soap opera (namely, “The Valley of the Wolves: 
Ambush”) that showed Mossad (Israel’s intelligence service) spying inside Turkey and 
abducting Turkish babies. Moreover, the program depicted Mossad attacking the Turkish 
embassy in Tel Aviv, taking the ambassador together with his family hostage (Flower and 
Medding 2010). It is worth highlighting the Anti-Semitism commonly seen in Turkish TV 
series as Jewish people constitute the most evil villains in various popular shows (Erdemir 
and Kessler 2017).  
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Another case in point is the series entitled “Endless Love”, produced in Istanbul (in 
2015) which won an International Emmy Award, has been translated in more than 50 
languages (Persian and Arabic included), and is relishing high ratings in various countries, 
from Iran, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan to Balkan countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Albania, FYROM and Montenegro (Synovitz 2018). However, in places such as, Uzbekistan, 
the show in question was banned by the country’s President, Shavkat Mirziyoev. The reason 
being that religion is rigidly controlled by the national security services for many years now, 
masquerading as the fight against Islamic extremism, and this particular series has stirred 
controversy from radical Islamists and the state that wishes to make sure that the role of the 
family in Uzbek society will not be threatened (Synovitz 2018).    
The magnitude of TV series and recent developments is certainly worthy of heed at this 
point. TV series have been depicting their own distinctive brand of soft power in the Arab 
world for some time now, with clerics in Saudi Arabia having issued fatwas – or religious 
decrees (Moussley 2008) – ordering death sentences for the creators of numerous shows like 
these dramas that cause marital friction to the point of divorce (Zalewski 2013). Not to 
mention how a number of religious scholars in predominantly conservative nations, such as 
Egypt and Afghanistan, blame the growing divorce rate on these TV shows (Nawa 2017).      
Moreover, the MBC Group (the Arab world’s leading private broadcaster), which 
happens to be Dubai-based and under the control of Saudi investors, was ordered to end its 
broadcasting of incredibly popular Turkish TV shows (Sharma 2018). More specifically, the 
decision covers the entire programs originating from Turkey and influences six shows (Uras 
2018). This decision took place against the background of escalating tensions between 
Turkey and the Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates axis in the commotion over Qatar's 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Saudis and Emiratis have branded a 
“terrorist” organization. The ban can help the latter demonstrate to their allies that they are 
backing them while, synchronously, communicate to their domestic audiences that they are 
combating unwanted and foreign cultural influences for internal consumption (Sharma 2018). 
To further elaborate, with regards to the recently antagonistic Saudi-Turkish relations, Turkey 
powerfully supports Qatar as Saudi Arabia (along with three other Arab states) boycotted it; 
plus, Turkey retains ties to Iran – the kingdom's number one regional opponent (Gambrell 
2018).
4
  Amr Adib, a popular Egyptian TV host, applauded the decision made by MBC and 
advised the satellite channels of Egypt to do the same (El-Behary 2018), demonstrating how 
similar tendencies of resistance to TFP exist elsewhere in the Middle East as well. This is not 
to argue that such incidents prove that there is not a market for Turkish TV series in the Arab 
World, or that they do not remain largely successful, but to highlight the dynamics of 
politicization, polarization and resistance that Turkish soft power often produces across the 
region. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The growth of the AKP’s domestic hegemony over the years has gradually enabled Turkey to 
pursue regional or international hegemony as well, with TV series being one aspect of these 
efforts. In this sense, for many years, TV series had the role of generating ideological and 
cultural power for Turkey within other countries. However, Ankara’s cultural propaganda 
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and exportation of values and norms to other peoples of the region and beyond made sense 
insofar Turkey had something substantial to offer such as a successful political and economic 
system. Even then, TV series were perceived as threatening by many. Since the early to mid-
2010s, Turkey’s hegemonic pursuit has encountered some major obstacles. The popularity of 
the so-called Turkish model started declining abroad, not least because of the country’s 
growing democratic deficit and deteriorating economy.  
The first significant fragments of resistance to the AKP’s hegemonic cultural project, 
domestically, manifested in 2013 when the Gezi Park Protests broke-out (Moudouros 2014; 
Onbaşı 2016). This crack in the AKP’s domestic hegemony was followed by the loss of the 
parliamentary majority, for the first time, in the June 2015 elections – which were, however, 
followed by a snap election in November 2015 after which the AKP regained the majority 
(Özge Kemahlıoğlu 2015). More such examples of resistance – to the otherwise resilient 
AKP government – can be given. Yet the bottom line is that, the more the AKP’s legitimacy 
erodes domestically, the more difficult it is for Ankara to effectively export hegemonic 
narratives and exert hegemonic power. It is no wonder that increasing domestic backlash to 
the AKP’s power has been followed by foreign policy challenges and increasing resistance to 
TV series, given that the latter have been growingly perceived as a threat and negative 
influence. It would, of course, be naïve to say that the AKP has completely lost its power 
domestically or that it no longer has the ability to exert influence abroad. Nonetheless, the 
examination of the rise and recent decline of Turkish TV series clearly demonstrates – as 
many other aspects of Turkish politics do – that the loss of popular legitimacy and growing 
authoritarianism (see e.g. Başer & Öztürk 2017) do not come without a cost and do not 
remain unchallenged.   
 
 
Notes 
 
1. See, for example, the Global Firepower Index for Turkey’s military power, 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=turkey 
(accessed 25 May 2018). 
2. See, for example, Turkey’s operations in Syria and Iraq as well as the growing number of 
Turkish military bases abroad (Kasapoglu 2017). 
3. A caveat here is that there are people who draw inspiration from watching Turkish TV 
drama series like Fatmagül where a gang-rape victim fights for justice. A case in point, in 
the wake of the recent Egyptian Revolution, is Samira, a sexual harassment victim in 
Cairo, admits to having found the courage – in spite of pressures to remain quiet – to take 
the offenders, that is, the army officers to court (van Versendaal 2014).   
4. It is worth noting that the removal of successful Turkish series from MBC is expected to 
continue in the future as well (Saeed 2018).  
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